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 This anthropological study explores the socio-political discourse of suzhi among the Mosuo 
minority, occupying the Yongning Basin region between Yunnan and Sichuan. The concept of suzhi, 
translating roughly as ‘quality’, first appeared during the 1980s in the context of ‘population 
quality’ (renkou suzhi), which refers variously to the educational attainment, material development, 
or more abstract moral quality of a people (see Jacka, 2009). In terms of ethnicity in China, 
numerous other studies have already shown how discourses like suzhi have been deployed to 
construct ‘Han modernity’ vis-a-vis its ‘Other’, the ‘primitive’ minority (see Zukosky, 2011, also 
Jacka, 2009; Gladney, 1994). Comparatively little inquiry has been directed toward how suzhi is 
negotiated within ethnic minority communities themselves. In response, this paper works to present 
an ethnographic lens onto the lived experience of suzhi discourse on the ground within the Mosuo 
minority. The study is based on fieldwork conducted over the course of 17 days in a variety of 
locations in the Lugu Lake area and Yongning Basin. Findings are derived from approximately 15 
casual interviews with informants in both traditional and ‘tourist village’ settings, representing the 
Mosuo, the Han, as well as other minorities such as the Pumi. 
 The study concludes that suzhi discourse is not only present as a static government trope, 
but alive and actively adapting in the local context of the Mosuo. In almost every case, my Mosuo 
informants regarded their own suzhi as exceptionally high. The majority of these informants cited 
the Mosuo ‘big family’ (da jiating) as the basis for such high suzhi - as the ‘big family’ required 
harmony, good manners, and an overriding care for all children as their own. Mosuo notions of 
suzhi also engage local folklore and the prevalent religious tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. In both 
cases, however, suzhi is clearly disassociated from educational attainment, material development, or 
any other markers of successful participation in the Chinese state and market economy - as many 
have argued is the contemporary function of official suzhi discourse (see Zukosky, 2011, 234). The 
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Mosuo have effectively renegotiated their own position within the rhetoric of suzhi outside of state 
or majority legitimation.  
ISP Topic Codes: Cultural Anthropology, Ethnicity, Political Science  
Keywords: Suzhi, ethnic minorities, discourse studies, anthropology of China 
 
G. Link  3III
Table of Contents: 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………….…… Pg. II-III 





Research and Ethnographic Methods……………………………………………..………………….Pg. 4-9 
The Construction of Mosuo Primitivity…………………………………………………………….Pg. 9-12 
Minority Suzhi and Counter-Discourse Among the Mosuo……………………….…………….Pg. 12-18 
Preempting Suzhi……………………………………………………………………………………..Pg. 18-19 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………..………………Pg. 19-21 





 This paper would not exist if for the contributions, guidance, and hospitality of my friends, 
research partners (informants), colleagues, and advisors both in Kunming and the Lugu Lake area. I 
am indebted first and foremost to Lu Yuan, my program advisor through SIT, for her consistent 
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to the late Barney Bate, my former advisor, professor, and friend who passed away during my 
semester in China. Barney is the reason I ‘found’ anthropology. I will be forever grateful for his 
inspiring myself and countless others to be imagineers of the human in all its wonderful, goofy, 




 The concept of suzhi, translating roughly as ‘quality’, is among the key social discourses of 
modern China. While similar concepts have existed for millennia in Confucian notions of self-
cultivation, suzhi is located particularly in the contemporary politics of the post-Mao state. The term 
acquired its current meanings through the state’s propaganda efforts during the modernisation and 
family planning campaigns of the 1980s (Jacka, 2009). Its first appearance was in the context of 
‘population quality’ (renkou suzhi), which refers variously to the educational attainment, material 
development, or more abstract moral quality of a people. In this sense, suzhi is intimately bound up 
with the development paradigm of the Communist Party. It is embedded with the value systems of 
the Chinese state, encompassing modes of economics, modernity, morality, and social order. Of 
course, the precise content of these value systems has changed over time, and the meaning of suzhi 
has been accordingly fluid. As many scholars are keen to point out, suzhi has taken on new 
dimensions with the rise of neoliberal market forms in China (see Anagnost, 2004, 193-194). Suzhi 
is here defined as the sum of abilities which enable a population to participate successfully in the 
global market economy. Regardless of its signification, however, suzhi consistently functions as a 
‘social field’ in the terms of Pierre Bourdieu - a reference framework of value, civilisation, culture, 
and morality established and maintained by the symbolic power of its creator, most often the central 
state (see Bourdieu, 1992). As a result, suzhi exists in the moment it marks difference and division. 
As Tamara Jacka writes, “suzhi is not just a normative goal or substance, supposedly attainable by 
all. It is also a value coding used to differentiate and highlight gaps between, for example, the good 
and bad, rich and poor, civilized and uncivilized.” (Jacka, 2009, 525)  
 In terms of ethnicity in China, numerous studies have already documented how discourses 
like suzhi have been deployed to construct ‘Han modernity’ vis-a-vis its ‘Other’, the ‘primitive’, 
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eroticised, romanticised minority (see Zukosky, 2011, also Jacka, 2009; Gladney, 1994). Despite the 
recent spate of suzhi-based studies in anthropology, comparatively little inquiry has been directed 
toward how suzhi is negotiated within ethnic minority communities themselves. In other words, 
how do marginal and subaltern groups such as ethnic minorities take a dominant, state-driven 
discourse such as suzhi and redefine, readapt, or re-strategise it to local ends? While originally 
forged with the symbolic powers of the state, the state’s domination of suzhi discourse is not total. 
Space for creative resistance and appropriation of suzhi exists among China’s subalterns. In other 
words, while these subalterns “‘make sense of their own world and experience with the language by 
which they are discriminated against’ (as cited in Caldeira, 2000, 85), they nonetheless do so in 
ways that undermine the univocality of the state's authoritative discourse (as cited in Bakhtin, 1981, 
342-44; see also Litzinger, 2000, 211).” (Friedman, 2004, 708) In response, this paper works to 
present an ethnographic lens onto the lived experience of suzhi discourse within the Mosuo minority 
group, occupying the Yongning Basin region straddling the border between Yunnan and Sichuan.  
 The selection of the Mosuo for an ethnography of minority suzhi was based on several 
unique facets of their group identity - namely, their matrilineal, ‘big’ family structure, historical 
practice of a ‘walking marriage’ visiting system (zouhun or tisese in the Mosuo language of Naru) 
instead of institutionalised marriage, and contested position within ethnic minority classifications. 
Note that this paper will use the indigenous Naru term of tisese such as to preempt the web of 
connotations associated with both the English and Chinese translations. With regard to ethnic 
classification, the Mosuo remain without an official nationality (minzu) designation, instead being 
viewed as a subgroup under the Naxi minority if residing in Yunnan or the Mongolian minority if 
residing in Sichuan. Historically, the Mosuo are indeed a cultural cousin of the Naxi, with a similar 
language and political status in imperial China (Shih, 2009, 29). Yet the Yunnan Mosuo vehemently 
deny their identification with the Naxi, perhaps - as Chuan-kang Shih (2009) has argued - because 
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the Naxi are already a prominent ethnic group in Yunnan with their own political representation. By 
contrast, the Mosuo are the only Mongolian group in Sichuan, and therefore lack any potential 
competitors for representation and entitlements. As I will argue, the problematic status of the 
Yunnan Mosuo means that suzhi becomes an alternate set of grounds for symbolic citizenship in the 
Chinese state (see Friedman, 2004).  
 Meanwhile, the Mosuo’s distinctive kinship structure and gender system clearly deviate 
from the urban Han family which embodies the paradigmatic suzhi of ‘modernity’, and whose 
image is still heavily marked by the One Child Policy. Anagnost elaborates that it is “the body of 
the urban, middle-class only child, which is fetishized as a site for the accumulation of the very 
dimensions of suzhi wanting in its ‘other.’” (Anagnost, 2004, 190). Suzhi thereby embeds a 
sometimes implicit, often explicit conception of the ‘high quality’ Chinese family. A rhyming 
propaganda slogan found throughout rural China establishes the intimate connection between suzhi 
and child-birthing and raising practices:  
Renkou suzhi yao tigao, 
Yousheng youyu hen zhongyao. 
[To improve population suzhi, eugenics and a superior upbringing are very important. (translation 
mine)] 
  
In another slogan I observed outside a primary school in Yongning, this connection is extended 
toward the nation and its people more generally.  
Yousheng youyu youjiao  
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Liguo limin lijia. 
[Eugenics, Superior Upbringing, Superior Education; To benefit the nation, the people, and the 
family. (translation mine)] 
 Thus insofar as suzhi entails a moral system of child-birthing and rearing, the Mosuo plainly 
defy official conceptions of high suzhi. The state’s definition of ‘eugenics’ and ‘superior upbringing’ 
- not to mention ‘family’ - are foreign if not inapplicable to the context of a matrilineal, ‘daughter-
loving’ society wherein children are historically birthed by tisese relationships and raised in the 
maternal household separately from the father  (see Shih, 2009, 147). The present study therefore 1
seeks to clarify the practices and strategies deployed by minorities in navigating the suzhi discourse, 
which in the case of the Mosuo might otherwise label their familial and sexual practices as markers 
of low suzhi. Methodologically, this involves a thorough consideration of how the Mosuo self-
identify within the terms of suzhi, and why. Taken as a whole, the lens of the suzhi discourse sheds 
light on the complex interplay of the central state with minority value systems in contemporary 
China. 
Research and Ethnographic Methods: 
 This study draws primarily on the anthropological method of ethnographic fieldwork. Here I 
take cue from Kathleen and Billie Dewalt’s summary in the Handbook of Methods in Cultural 
Anthropology: “…an observer takes part in the activities, rituals, interactions, and events of the 
In a tisese situation, Mosuo fathers may play an equal role in childcare but still are not members of the 1
household.
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people being studied as one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their 
culture.” (Dewalt & Dewalt, 1998) Given the relatively loose, constantly adapting nature of 
ethnographic fieldwork, I do not intend to outline a ‘replicable’ procedure for my study. The idea of 
replicability contradicts the nature of ethnography. The situations I engaged and interviews I 
conducted were based largely on unstructured, spontaneous happenings in the spaces with which I 
surrounded myself. Of course, I played some role in the selection of those spaces and the people 
who inhabited them. But that role should not be overstated. Many other unplanned connections 
influenced the process at all levels - from locations, to interview opportunities, to thematic focuses. 
Moreover, a field researcher is always obliged first and foremost to his/her informants. They must 
always ensure that their research does not harm or endanger these informants, paying particular 
attention to anonymity. In accordance with these principles, I will not be stating the identities or 
affiliations of those I interviewed beyond several key informants.  
 In terms of the practical logistics and day-to-day experience of my research, the study was 
conducted over the course of 17 days in a variety of locations near the Lugu Lake area and 
Yongning Basin. Findings are derived from approximately 15 casual interviews with informants in 
both traditional and ‘tourist village’ settings, representing the Mosuo, the Han, as well as other 
minorities such as the Pumi. The first two days of the study were spent in Luoshui, the main tourist 
town on the Yunnan side of Lugu Lake. Upon arrival at the long-distance bus station, I met with a 
member of the Mosuo Cultural Preservation Association (Cao Laoshi) with whom my academic 
director had acquainted me the week before. The next couple of days were spent exploring the local 
Mosuo Museum in Luoshui, as well as completing a circuit around the lake to survey potential areas 
of interest. Soon thereafter, Cao Laoshi offered to bring me to a small village called Wenquan 
roughly 20km to the north of Yongning. Wenquan is a relatively typical Mosuo village, populated 
almost exclusively by Mosuo and operating within a primarily agricultural economy. Signs of 
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material development abound throughout the single 400 meter stretch of main road. Most houses 
have been recently renovated and refurnished; a brand new primary school towers over the town as 
the tallest structure in the area. Given its location, Wenquan is entirely unaffected by the tourism 
industry which predominates Lugu Lake further to its south. For these reasons, the rural, local 
Mosuo environment of Wenquan provided an invaluable lens onto the lived experience and thoughts 
of Mosuo engaging suzhi on the ground.  
 While in Wenquan, Cao Laoshi helped to arrange my stay with a local household headed by 
a renowned Mosuo weaver, Aqi Duzhima (abbreviated to Aqi in this study). For the following 
week, I spent all of my meals and much of my days ‘hanging about’ with the members of the 
household, as well as the other employees of the weaving business managed by Aqi. This time 
provided many opportunities to speak at length with both the household members as well as 
numerous others throughout the village. Most of my mornings were spent wandering the main 
street, speaking to shopkeepers or groups of people resting on stools outside small provisions shops. 
After my week-long stay in Wenquan, I spent a brief stint back in Luoshui to compile and analyse 
my fieldnotes before moving to meet another contact in the smaller tourist town of Lige roughly 
9km north. This contact was a young Han woman named Xian. Originally from Chengdu, she 
attended college in the United States before moving back to Lugu Lake to help run a guesthouse 
and found a minorities advocacy NGO. For the next several days, Xian arranged many informal 
interviews with her local Mosuo contacts and assisted in translation wherever needed.  
 In both Lige and Wenquan, I allowed these interviews to remain informal and relatively 
spontaneous in order to encourage open sharing and rapport. Despite being casual, however, my 
analysis and ‘interviews’ remained informed by ethnographic technique. Texts such as Charles 
Briggs’ Learning How to Ask provided the useful concepts of social context, indexical meaning, and 
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interactional goals (Briggs, 1986). I based most of my interviews on a core set of suzhi-centric 
questions prepared before entry into the field. This series of questions usually began with a general 
inquiry into the benefits or challenges of living in the area, such as to encourage an initial level of 
comfort with my informants. Although the use of the actual term suzhi was initially a point of 
concern due to its heavy political charge and formality, I found that nearly everyone immediately 
understood and knew what I meant with this word - no repeats were necessary, nor did I observe 
any signs of hesitation or awkwardness. It seemed in all ways to be an extremely mundane, 
everyday question. As a result, I found no need to be circuitous in my approach - instead asking 
directly about suzhi through questions such as:  
-How is the suzhi of the Mosuo people living here? Why?  
-How does the suzhi of the Mosuo compare to other ethnic minorities? Why? 
-What kind of cultural values does the Mosuo family structure represent?  
-What kind of effect has development had on the suzhi of the Mosuo, if any?  
-What kind of effect does religion, including Tibetan Buddhism and the local Mosuo Ddaba 
religion, have on the suzhi of the Mosuo, if any? 
These questions were altered throughout the study for clearer phrasing, while others were 
introduced into the set based on the findings of previous interviews. Of course, rapport-building 
during interviews was key to overcoming possible unease about my position as researcher - 
particularly in the context of the Mosuo.  
 The past several decades have seen the Mosuo subjected to numerous anthropological 
studies, which have all often too often misunderstood and misrepresented the gender system, family 
structure, and ‘walking marriage’ . This has manifest in a widespread body of (predominately 2
 The term ‘walking marriage’ can continue to hold negative, salacious connotations, particularly in the view 2
of the Mosuo themselves.
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Chinese) literature which labels the Mosuo as primitive, backward, or a ‘living fossil society’ within 
a Marxist, stadial evolutionary view of society. I believe most Mosuo, and current anthropologists 
for that matter, would argue that anthropology has thereby done a great disservice to Mosuo culture 
as well as to the field itself. As Shih notes his own ethnography of the Mosuo (The Quest for 
Harmony) based on over 20 years of research, this continues to taint the reputation of 
anthropologists through to the present day. In one of his first meetings with a prominent Mosuo 
leader in Yongning, Shih was immediately pried as to whether he felt the Mosuo were primitive or 
matrilineal (Shih, 2009, 132). As Shih writes: 
I had heard about how intensely upset the Moso were about being characterized as 
remnants of a “primitive matrilineal society” in the Chinese ethnographies. Even with 
that prep, such a blunt personal encounter at my very first meeting with a Moso in their 
homeland still caught me off guard. The combination of the attitude and the questions 
was a strong message about how deeply and personally the Moso people feel about that 
evolutionist theorization of their culture. It was also a clear signal of how hard it would 
be for me to overcome the distrust and win rapprochement with the Moso. (Shih, 2009, 
133) 
I experienced the depth of these feelings myself whilst talking to an older man in Wenquan, who 
spoke of the many foreigners in the Mosuo homelands who “come one day, leave the next, and then 
return home and write it up as truth.” Despite my assurances of genuine interest, and that I would 
write very carefully to avoid misrepresentation (to the best of my knowledge), I doubt my words 
were entirely persuasive. Fortunately, the great majority of Mosuo whom I interviewed were very 
eager to respond and share their thoughts. As one man in Wenquan put it, slowly lowering his 
cigarette: “Well look, I'm talking to you and answering your questions, right? That's the kind of 
people we are."  
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 The basic method of data collection for any ethnographic study is fieldnotes. This study was 
no different. I recorded in-depth typed fieldnotes every day, or after every interview. I found that 
rigorous note-taking during the interviews themselves often obstructed the flow of the conversation, 
or otherwise distracted both my interviewee and myself. If a specific word was particularly 
important for later translation, I would make a mental note or otherwise quickly scribble it down 
before returning to eye contact with my conversation partner. These fieldnotes were compiled and 
summarised thematically every several days. I concluded my fieldwork with a final stint in Luoshui 




The Construction of Mosuo Primitivity:  
  
 Before moving to consider the negotiation of suzhi by the Mosuo themselves, we turn first 
to locate the Mosuo within the terms that represent them in Han popular discourse. This process of 
public representation takes place through a combination of academia, literature, and tourism. As 
Eileen Walsh describes, “[m]edia accounts of Mosuo culture tend to highlight several 
characteristics: (1) an exotic sexuality—zouhun, which many Chinese interpret as “free love”; (2) 
matriarchy—a land where women rule; and (3) primitivity—a society that has not evolved.” (Walsh, 
2005, 463) Influential Chinese publications such as Leaving Mother Lake: A Girlhood at the Edge 
of the World (Namu, 2003) or A Society Without Fathers or Husbands (Hua, 2001) reinforce this 
unsettling precedent for the tone of Mosuo anthropological studies. Meanwhile, the tourism 
industry has crafted the Lugu Lake region into the ‘Kingdom of Daughters’ (Nü'er Guo) for the sake 
of commercial appeal (see Walsh, 2005). An English signboard inside the newly opened Mosuo 
Museum in Boshu Village, Sichuan, reads:  
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Enter Lake Lugu, and explore the ultimate mystery of matrilineal clans. 
Enter Lake Lugu, and encounter primeval human civilisation.  
Enter Lake Lugu, and experience the colourful allure of the Mosuo. 
These types of depictions are beyond commonplace. Collectively, they serve to advance the same 
process of sexual eroticisation, romanticisation, and commercialisation as is carried out upon 
China’s ethic minorities at large (see Gladney, 1994 on ‘internal Orientalism’). “Within the touristic 
frame and imagination”, Walsh writes, “the multiple ways of imagining Mosuo territory, as a land 
of women and a land of sex, blur into a land of women for sex.” (Walsh 2005, 472) The state and 
market thereby render the Mosuo into a spectacle of tourism , rather than acknowledging their 3
social modernity as established by the state's own criteria including gender equality and ‘daughter-
valuing’ (see Eklund, 2011). The effect here, and in minority representation generally, is then to 
insulate the Han against any potentially competing claim on legitimate modernity. Mosuo people 
are depicted as the physical embodiment of the ‘primitive’ or even ‘primeval’ stage in social 
evolution from which the Han have long since advanced. The preservation of the Mosuo as a ‘living 
fossil’ becomes, in the words of Johannes Fabian, a ‘denial of coevalness’ - denying the shared, 
contemporaneous existence of the anthropologist (or Han tourist, subject) and informant (Mosuo, 
object) (see Fabian, 1983). Minority ‘Others’ are given other times, other eras in which to exist 
rhetorically. This serves to both maintain the primitivity of the Mosuo, whilst simultaneously 
ensuring the relative modernity of the majority subject.  
 Returning to historical context, these constructions of Mosuo primitivity find their origins in 
state modernising projects beginning with the Democratic Reforms of 1956 and continuing through 
 Of course, some Mosuo also perform their own ‘primitivity’ for the tourism market.3
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the Cultural Revolution. The so-called Democratic Reforms dissolved the existing, centuries-old 
chieftain system of political organisation in Mosuo society (Shih 2009, 58). As Shih summarises, 
“[w]hen it [the Democratic Reform] was completed in 1958, Moso society had been fully 
incorporated into the Chinese communist system and was structured like any other rural community 
in contemporary China.” (Shih 2009, 58) Ten years later, the Cultural Revolution unleashed yet 
another onslaught upon the social organisation of Mosuo society. An elderly Mosuo woman in Lige 
told of how the ‘big family structure’ was suppressed and marriage forced upon the population, as 
those in tisese relationships were forced to choose a partner for official marriage registration. While 
the explicit, brutal suppression of Mosuo society under the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, it 
was resurrected with suzhi discourse as a softer form of social control by the mid-1980s. The rise of 
‘ethnotourism’ around Lugu Lake since the early 1990s has again shifted the landscape of social 
control, with a rising tension between suzhi as a development paradigm and the preservationist 
motives of a tourism-based economy. Indeed, the profitability of crafting a ‘Kingdom of Daughters’ 
based loosely on historical realities of matrilineality and tisese puts tension on the convenient 
equation of ‘traditional’ family patterns with low suzhi. In other words, the very elements of Mosuo 
society which suffered persecution under Maoist government have been transformed into the pride 
of contemporary Mosuo identity (Walsh 2005, 457). As a young Han woman in Lige explained: 
Many Han want to be like them [the Mosuo]. You see, many of the Han tourists coming 
here have already attained material civilisation (wuzhi wenming) and now want spiritual 
civilisation (jingshen wenming) [reference to Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Civilisations’ 
outlined in the late 1980s, also including political civilisation]. They admire the 
primitive way of thought here, the simplicity, the generosity, the harmony. They come 
here to experience this and bring it back into their own lives.   
                    (Fieldnote, May 12) 
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In this way, she explains, many of the Han tourists feel that the Mosuo possess higher suzhi than 
themselves, as their own lives have become entrapped by hyper-materialism. But I push further and 
ask, do the Han then want to be primitive? Laughing, she exclaims “No, of course not!” Put 
differently, the majority seeks to extract whatever 'primitive', simple moral goodness exists in the 
Mosuo homeland, but certainly are willing and eager to do so without compromising their own 
modernity. In fact, their coming to Lugu Lake and making spectacle of this 'primitive' morality is 
itself an expression of middle-class, neoliberal Chinese citizenry. This again has the discursive 
effect of containing the Mosuo in a veil of frozen primitivity (i.e. denying coevalness) from which 
the majority consume suzhi and thereby “bring it back into their own lives”. Critically, however, 
such a notion of suzhi entirely contradicts the original state sense of population quality - to have 
high suzhi despite or precisely because of rural ‘primitivity’. As I will argue, these external 
discourses have prompted a corresponding renegotiation of the Mosuo’s own position within the 
rhetoric of suzhi, outside of state or majority legitimation.  
  
  
Minority Suzhi and Counter-Discourse Among the Mosuo:  
 The suzhi discourse is not only present as a static government trope, but alive and actively 
adapting in the local context of the Mosuo. Everyone I spoke to on this topic immediately 
understood and knew what I meant in saying ‘suzhi’. No second repeats of my questions were 
necessary, nor did my informants show any signs of hesitation or awkwardness in responding about 
suzhi. In virtually every case, my Mosuo informants self-rated their own suzhi as being 
exceptionally high - certainly higher than the other ethnic minorities of the region such as the Yi and 
Naxi (of which they are officially also a member), and in some cases even higher than the Han. As 
one shopkeeper in Wenquan explained:  
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We Mosuo don't fight among ourselves. We don't have conflict. We're not like that. But 
the Naxi, the Yi, they’re often fighting, and they cheat and deceive. That's why, you 
might have noticed, we don't deal with those people. They have very poor suzhi. Our 
suzhi is very good.    
          (Fieldnote, May 8) 
These comparisons with other ethnic groups were unprompted by my questioning; comparison 
seemed to be the natural use of suzhi discourse. Many Mosuo gave similar accounts of their relative 
suzhi, particularly with regard to the Yi - with whom the Mosuo have a historical feud based on the 
alleged patterns of Yi men raiding Mosuo villages over the past few centuries. A young Mosuo man 
named Zhaxi spoke to his personal experience of suzhi, confirming that this term is most commonly 
heard in informal conversations with friends while discussing the other minorities. The great 
majority of my informants, including Zhaxi, immediately cited the Mosuo ‘big family structure’ (da 
jiating) as the grounds for their comparatively high suzhi. As Aqi remarked over tea one morning: 
There many aspects to the suzhi of the Mosuo, and many layers. But the two most 
important things are firstly, that the older care for the young regardless of whether they 
are their own children. In other places, parents only care for their own kids. Here it's not 
like that… Secondly, because of the ‘big family structure’, we do many things together - 
work, eat, etcetera. (Remember that we all drank together last night! [she adds]). And 
we are all blood-related in the household. So we get along with one another, have good 
hearts, and are kind people.   
          (Fieldnote, May 6) 
In fact, Aqi is legally married with a live-in husband. Numerous interviews would later confirm that 
tisese is rapidly being overtaken by marriage as the predominant form of sexual union. Despite 
these changes, the residual, embedded values of the ‘big family structure’ continue to hold in the 
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popular imagining of Mosuo suzhi. Aqi’s husband reiterated the continuing influence of the da 
jiating:  
Especially in earlier times, families might have 17 or 18 people all living together - the 
entire maternal line and siblings and children, compared to the Han family with just the 
two parents, then maybe the father’s parents and a single child. The big family means 
that in order to get along, everyone has to have good manners.   
          (Fieldnote, May 5) 
These discussions invoke suzhi at the most superficial level of manners (limao), as well as the more 
abstract moral 'goodness' cited by Aqi. Outside of ‘big family structure’, several interviews also 
raised religious morality as a critical aspect of Mosuo suzhi. This morality was founded on Tibetan 
Buddhism, the historically predominant tradition of the Mosuo alongside local Ddaba religion. Aqi 
described the role of these two religions as representing two different philosophical perspectives 
(zhexue guandian), wherein “Ddaba is more about the day-to-day life happenings, coming and 
going down the street, or you coming and going from your room. It's more direct and immediate. 
Buddhism on the other hand is more about the things you can't see, and about the afterlife.” The 
influence of Tibetan Buddhism in particular means, as many commented, that the Mosuo “are not 
allowed to do wrong” (bu hui zuo huai shi). While often raised, this point of suzhi seemed less 
consistent across my informants’ responses. Aqi’s husband submitted that “actually religion has 
little impact on the Mosuo way of life”. Whatever the role of Tibetan Buddhism in the Mosuo’s self 
understanding of their own suzhi, ‘big family structure’ was the dominant thread across the 
conversations.  
  In yet another turn from state-issued suzhi, we return to Zhaxi. Speaking of the contexts in 
which suzhi operates, Zhaxi was keen to point toward Mosuo mythology and its embedded 
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conceptions of moral quality. In one particular creation myth about Lugu Lake, Zhaxi interprets a 
parable on suzhi for its lessons on trustworthiness and greed. As the story goes, there was a boy 
herding sheep in the hills, who finds a fish stuck in a large hole. The fish tells him to cut a piece 
from itself and eat it every day, because it will alway grows back. Eventually the boy’s mom notices 
him getting fatter and follows him the next day without him knowing. Seeing what happens, she 
goes back to tell all the other villagers about the fish - who soon descend upon the creature with 
tools, knives, and buckets, finishing it off entirely. By so doing, however, the villagers unwittingly 
unplug the hole the fish was stuck in, which begins to gush forth with water - flooding their village 
and drowning all but one, who survives by floating in a pig trough-become-boat. The lone survivor, 
a young girl, then goes on to become the ancestor of the Mosuo. To Zhaxi, this piece of folklore is a 
powerful representation and conveyor of suzhi into contemporary Mosuo life. Far from the 
fetishised high suzhi image of an urbanite, middle-class, single Han child, suzhi is instead located 
within local traditions and practices of memory.  
 Both in folklore and discussions of ‘big family’ or religious morality, suzhi no longer refers 
to educational attainment, material development, or any other markers of successful participation in 
the Chinese state and market economy - as many have argued is the contemporary function of 
official suzhi discourse (see Zukosky 2011, 234). These studies thus conceive suzhi as neoliberal 
‘governmentality’, serving to transfer responsibility for governance into the Chinese subject itself in 
efforts to internalise state-approved modes of performing citizenship (see Foucault, 1988, also 
Sigley, 2006). The suzhi discourse deployed by the Mosuo effectively evades this frame.  
 Under the governmentality view, suzhi operates as a ‘blame the victim’ discourse and 
political smokescreen. The onus of development and economic prosperity is placed on the 
individual while overlooking the state policies which may produce low suzhi through structural 
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disadvantage. Yet this link between suzhi and participation in the market economy was openly 
contested on the ground in Yongning. At the main Tibetan Buddhist temple of Yongning (Zhameisi), 
a monk painted the relationship antithetically to the state:  
The suzhi of the people here used to be better, but now it's getting worse and worse. 
This is because of spiritual pollution from the economy. Now people only care about 
money. Before people could just rely on themselves and each other, now they rely 
completely on money. You know, at Lugu Lake, all the tourism, it's all focused entirely 
on making money. Everywhere it's like this now. People come to look around, eat hot 
pot, get themselves full, and that's enough for them. They don't realise that this, this is 
the simplest thing to do. But it's useless. It's useless to only look around, have and spend 
money, then think yourself so great for doing so. [italics mine]   
                    (Fieldnote, May 11) 
These differing conceptions of ‘usefulness’ pervade the disjunct between Mosuo and official 
conceptions of the suzhi discourse. Whereas suzhi is officially “involved in producing new kinds of 
contemporary Chinese subjects, the agents who are the conditions of possibility for China's new 
market economy”, the minority context of Yongning sees these dimensions overshadowed by the 
moral and spiritual facets of human ‘quality’ (Zukosky, 2011, 234). Similar sentiments expressed 
themselves among the lay population in the nearby village of Zhudi, where a Mosuo construction 
worker related decreasing suzhi to the influence of Han culture and the opening of the economy.  
First of all, in every place, different people have different suzhi. Here with the Mosuo, it 
generally used to be good, but now it's changing for the worse. Before, because of big 
family structure, everyone cared for each others' kids as though they were their own. So 
there were no orphans. But now because of the influence of Han culture, this family 
structure is changing, getting smaller, and dividing up. Also because of the opening of 
the economy (jingji kaifang), now everyone only cares about money… So the 
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decreasing suzhi of the Mosuo is due to two things  - the influence of Han culture, and 
the rise of the open market economy.       
                    (Fieldnote, May 13) 
The effects of the market economy on Mosuo family structure came up repeatedly in following 
conversations, becoming a focal point for the suzhi reflections. These effects were generally 
explained in terms of incentives for profitability - whether easier allocation of money across 
business partners, more potential revenue when split into smaller families each with their own 
sources of income, or more compact, efficient organisation. Zhaxi later drew these thoughts to their 
synthesis, remarking that marriage is the most conducive analogue of the market economy with 
partners operating as an economic and legal unit. In other words, the neoliberal market practices 
embodied in tourism have inflicted a certain level of structural violence against traditional Mosuo 
family structure. At the same time, Zhaxi responded, they have also resulted in far greater wealth 
and material development (wuzhi fazhan) than previous economic modes could ever achieve. The 
primary concern is rather spiritual development (jingshen fazhan). Zhaxi spoke of the inevitable 
contradiction between preserving culture, in which case he remarked that “we should all live in 
simple villages”, and the imperative to make money and participate in the market economy. The 
‘violence’ of these structures thus exists in the sense of depriving the Mosuo of effective autonomy 
over choice of family structure and lifestyle.  
 While Han culture is here depicted apart from the market system, the reality of this 
distinction may be more tenuous. As the dominant signifier for national identity and agendas, ‘Han 
culture’ is intricately bound up with the economic system of the state itself. Of course, ‘Han culture’ 
is itself a nebulous and generalised image in the Chinese public sphere - again, maintained in large 
measure through contradistinction with the minority ‘Other’. The construction of the ‘modern’ Han 
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majority occurs concomitantly with the construction of the ‘primitive’ minority (again, see Gladney,  
1994). The Mosuo explicitly invert this relationship, framing ‘Hanification’ as a threat to the very 
suzhi that the Han have historically epitomised in the discourse. 
Preempting Suzhi: 
 Insofar as suzhi entails a moral system of child-birthing and rearing, the Mosuo clearly 
deviate from official conceptions of high suzhi. Aqi’s husband went so far as to claim that Mosuo 
family structure is the “opposite of the Yi, and more or less the Han”. As a result, the state’s 
definition of ‘eugenics’, ‘superior upbringing’ and indeed ‘family’ itself are unfamiliar, and perhaps 
even irrelevant in the context of a matrilineal, ‘daughter-loving’ society wherein children are 
historically birthed by tisese relationships and raised in the maternal household separately from the 
father. To add to the social dynamics, there are no left-over women in Mosuo society. There are no 
orphans. Given the changes in China's general social climate surrounding sexual liberalisation, the 
Mosuo are - by majority China's own standards - social ‘moderns’ par excellence. The Mosuo still 
enjoy a level of gender equality that the state-sponsored Women's Federation could only dream of 
attaining in contemporary China, let alone in 1949. As Cao Laoshi observed over dinner in Lijiang, 
“the Mosuo should be a model for civil society and rights advocacy in China. We already have the 
society the whole world dreams of.” 
 How, then, can we frame the applicability of family suzhi (born out of suzhi's original sense 
in family planning) to the Mosuo? They preempt the application of the suzhi discourse to the family 
sphere, rendering it inert. Rather than being 'primitive' , it is the very practices of matrilineality and 
tisese which have placed the Mosuo in a position of such sexual modernity, and preempted the 
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state's family suzhi discourse. The state, having never granted the Mosuo official minzu status 
despite decades of petitions, has only contributed to the intensification of Mosuo self-identification 
(Shih, 2009, 29). If ever I asked whether a Mosuo informant was a member of the Naxi or 
Mongolian ethnicity (minzu), they would immediately retort that “I am a Mosuo person (mosuo 
ren)”. Aqi outrightly calls the classification of Yunnan Mosuo under the Naxi as “a mistake”. Taken 
as a whole, these acts of counter-discourse amount to an alternative mode of performing minority 
citizenship in contemporary China.  
 In response to the political and symbolic exclusion of the Mosuo entailed by their non-
recognition, suzhi also becomes an alternate set of grounds for symbolic citizenship in the Chinese 
state (see Friedman, 2004). Here I take theoretical cue from Chi-yu Shih in treating China as “more 
a process than an entity. China does not just contain citizens, but also lives on millions of mini-
practices of citizenship. I would argue that China is a part of minorities rather than minorities a part 
of China.” (Shih, 2002, 235) The same framing applies to suzhi, which despite its intimate 
association with ‘China’ through official state discourse, has come to be re-appropriated and re-
deployed in the context of the Mosuo minority.  
Conclusion:  
 Within the context of the Mosuo, suzhi embeds a range of locally-contextual history and 
values influenced critically by cultural practices such as matrilineality, ‘big family structure’, and 
tisese. Despite the rapid decline of these practices, the residual, embedded values of Mosuo family 
life - particularly ‘big family structure’ - continue to shape the popular construction of Mosuo suzhi. 
The ‘big family’ (da jiating) was cited as the basis for Mosuo families’ need for harmony, good 
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manners, and an overriding care for all children as their own. These values also exist in interplay 
with local Mosuo folklore and the prevalent religious tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. Some 
informants grounded their own suzhi on religious morality, stating that they “are not allowed to do 
wrong”. Others such as Zhaxi invoked local parables and creation myths as historical sources for 
Mosuo suzhi - even if the term suzhi did not exist when the tale first originated. In terms of 
everyday deployments, suzhi most commonly operates as a mode of comparison with surrounding 
minorities such as the Yi and Naxi. 
  
 Again this use of suzhi is facilitated by the Mosuo's strong self-identification and self-
definition, produced ironically by their lack of official minzu status. In fact, the lack of official 
minzu status has perhaps contributed to the strength of the existing Mosuo family system in the face 
of the state and modernisation, and thereby to their corresponding conception of high suzhi. In all 
cases, however, suzhi is clearly disassociated from the Chinese state and market economy. Instead, 
‘big family structure’ and tisese - former targets of government persecution under the Cultural 
Revolution and embodiments of ‘primitivity’ in the eyes of contemporary tourism - themselves 
become the very foundations for the claim of high suzhi. Chi-yu Shih offers the useful framework 
of ‘China moments’ for conceptualising these negotiations and indeed the role of the state itself. 
Under the lens of such ‘China moments’, “China becomes meaningful to people as a nation-state 
insofar as it defines behavior, because referring to China either constrains behavior or motivates 
it… one cannot keep China in mind twenty-four hours a day.” (Shih, 2002, 7) Of course, while 
suzhi can be performed as a set of behaviours defined in reference to ‘China’, alternate referents 
also exist and find deployment among the Mosuo minority.  
 Rather than being a state monolith, the official discourse of suzhi interacts with the Mosuo 
through a multitude of negotiations, often strategic, and always diffused across many individual 
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sites of resistance. Insofar as suzhi embeds relations of symbolic power, the discourse is “exercised 
from innumerable points… there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition” between state and 
minority (Foucault, 1978, 94). Discourses like suzhi cease to be unitary wholes, and instead become 
products of many individual acts repeated in apparent patterns. These acts represent knowledge 
about a socio-historical constellation of power. As Foucault aptly observes: “…the network of 
power relations ends by forming a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, 
without being exactly localised in them…” (Foucault, 1978, 96). Suzhi is not only applied top-down 
univocally, but rather admits of many authors with a variety of intents and strategies. In short, 
‘China’ as a socio-political entity only ever exists within individual interactions, or ‘China 
moments’, between that entity and its subjects or participants. The same holds true for official 
discourses such as suzhi which embody and transmit the state into the public citizenry. Outside of 
these ‘moments’, however, suzhi is free to acquire novel meanings and effects that operate beyond 
its legitimate capacity.  
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Suggestions and Directions for Further Study:  
 This study engaged the particular context of the Mosuo, with limited attention given to the 
official perspective of local government in the Lugu Lake and Yongning area. Future studies could 
expand on the official use of suzhi discourse in minority areas, as well as the particular dynamics of 
state-Mosuo interaction. Alternative topics of study might consider the suzhi discourse in other 
minority contexts, or among the majority Han living in such minority areas. Potential research 
questions could include:  
-How is the suzhi discourse deployed among the Han majority in contemporary Chinese society?  
-How does suzhi play into the construction of other minority identities within Yunnan?  
-What are the dynamics of Mosuo-state interaction in the present day, and what consequences do 
these interactions entail for both sides?  
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